Introduction
The events which are now depicted as 'Arab spring' -social discontent across several largely Arab countries in North Africa and the Middle East -that from January 2011 rested on a wave of protests and revolutions. The 'Arab Spring' mostly occurred in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Yemen and Syria; Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Jordan, Algeria and Morocco were much less affected by this cycle of events and states were quick to limit the protests. Iraq was affected by protests against the government only later, in 2013. In Turkey too social unrest, the so-called Gezi park protests, erupted in 2013; these resembled the Tahrir square events in Cairo but had its own causes and dynamic. Notably in Syria, the protest and subsequent uprising in 2011 and 2012 led to a spiral of suppression and more protests and subsequently a kind of counter-revolution; it did not topple the regime as in other countries, like Tunisia and Egypt, though the government lost control over large parts of the country. Subsequently, this led to a long civil war which resulted in the death of so far over 400,000 people. Still, 13 million Syrians do not seem to have left their homes and thus seem to be somewhat resilient or even loyal to the government. Most notably, over nine million people were forceful displaced. By 2017, around six million people were internally displaced in Syria alone, almost 5 million Syrians had sought shelter in neighbouring countries, notably in Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan but also Iraq, and Egypt whilst around one million escaped to the European Union, together with another one million asylum seekers. A mix of those who did not leave their homes and those who were internally displaced are trapped in besieged and hard-to-reach areas, around 4.6 million people with another 13.5 million Syrians requiring humanitarian assistance (UNOCHA 2017) . Not only that those who fled from Syria, Iraq and elsewhere were de facto demanding from the EU to be protected and thus made a political claim; whilst on the move, people repeatedly and actively engaged in protests, like at the Turkish, Greek and Hungarian borders as well as in reception and detention centres to underscore their claims. The banners waved and slogans shouted resembled some of those used in the streets of Damascus, Homs and elsewhere. Occasionally, it occurred like the 'Arab spring' was coming to Europe. This suggests a succession and thus an intimate interrelation of protests, migration and yet more protests.
The 'Arab spring' has occasionally been analysed within the theoretical framework of 'voice, exit or loyalty ' (e.g. Fargues 2011; Droz-Vincent 2011; Pearlman 2013; Scott 2012; Kapur 2014; Markku 2014; Harris 2015; Van Hear 2014; Bonnefoy, Kuschnitizki, 2015) based on Hirschman's (1970) theory of largely voluntary responses to unfavourable conditions of members of organisations or customers. In what essentially is a theory of rational economic behaviour Hirschman identified three main types of responses: 'voice' meaning protest and complaints, 'exit' meaning migration and 'loyalty' meaning standing-by and resilience. He took for granted that 'management' or leadership would engage with the situation in a somewhat constructive manner. 'Exit' he understood as avoiding voice and 'minimising conflict' (Hirschman 1978, p. 92) . In a follow-up, Hirschman (1978) analysed 'exit' with respect to the state and analysed state responses to exit but, unfortunately, neglected state responses to 'voice'. Subsequently, Hirschman (1998) applied his simple model to the social and political events in Eastern Germany in 1989 and acknowledges that outmigration can be understood as 'exit' in response to unfavourable conditions and that social movements and revolutions can thus be understood as another expression of 'voice'. He still did not take into account the addressee of 'voice', organisations or states, their responses and how these then shape the options individuals have, hence whether they can actually stay or leave. But he was still questioning his initially binary approach of his thinking about 'voice' and 'exit' and acknowledged this being inappropriate and came to the conclusion that 'voice' and exit' can 'work in tandem' to change an undesirable situation. Further to this, his initial theory was situated in a liberal context where people were free to make a choice; his later writing instead analysed peoples' behaviour in the context of one illiberal state, the German Democratic Republic and one liberal state, the German Federal Republic. Finally, what was largely absent from his model was 'entry' after 'exit', the opportunity/constraints structure that determined individuals' choices and the circumstances under which entry was put into practice.
I will demonstrate, that the application of Hirschman's voice/exit model to illiberal states who refuse to respond to expressions of dissatisfaction in a constructive manner and to forced migration, as in the case of Syria, and in particular the succession of events -historical outmigration, a series of upheavals, outmigration accompanied by protests along the route -not only adds a new perspective to the analysis of the Syrian revolution and large scale migration but also provides opportunities as well as challenges for some revision of the voice/ exit model of Hirschman. Fargues (2011) in his earlier paper already analyses historical outmigration from Syria 'exit' as preceding 'voice'. Harris (2015) finds exactly the opposite in the case of Tunisia analysing 'exit' as a consequence of the opportunities that 'voice', the successful revolution, had created. In the case of Syria, as I will show, 'exit' is a rather unintended consequence of 'voice', notably a result of its suppression. This sheds further doubts over the interpretation of Hirschman's model of 'voice' or 'exit' as alternatives; instead, recent events show that (a) one might well be followed by the other in a succession of responses and (b) that there is a dynamic interplay of the two options. This questions Hirschman's initial understanding of the two types of responses as mutually exclusive and requires rethinking and revision of this theoretical framework. The third type of response, loyalty, is not further analysed here as the underlying research focussed on forced migrants and their actions but not on the people in Syria. This is actually practise for most references quoted here.
This contribution is based on desk research, some interviews conducted for a technical assistance project in Turkey in (Düvell, Soyusen, Corabatir 2015 and on the ESRC-funded project 'Unravelling the Mediterranean migration crisis' (MedMig¹) from 2015 to 2016. For the latter, we conducted 500 interviews with recently arrived individuals, these were identified by non-probability purposive sampling broadly reflecting the nationality, gender and age of all arrivals as it had become apparent from UNHCR statistics. The findings are not representative in quantitative term but sufficient to generalise about the key patterns as well as broad trends.
In the following, I will first sketch the developments of 'voice', hence the unrest and its repression in Syria. Second, I describe 'exit' meaning the forced migration of Syrians mainly to Turkey as it is the main receiving country. Third, I assess the policy responses and reception conditions in Turkey, analyse the migrants' and refugees' perception of these conditions and how this results in more 'exit' or onward migration. And finally, I consider 'voice' and specifically protests of migrants and refugees against reception conditions and closed borders in Turkey and specifically in the EU. In the conclusion I suggest a revision of the voice/exit model. 'exit' to 'voice' In 1953 'exit' to 'voice' In , 1954 , protest resulted in the then military leader Adib Shishakli being overthrown. Since 1963, Syria is ruled by the Ba-th party based on a mix of nationalism, socialism and authoritarianism. In 1971, Hafiz al-Assad led a coup to gain power; after his death in 2000, his son Bashar al-Assad was appointed general-secretary, then made candidate and subsequently president of the country. Initially, his partly western education had raised hopes for some liberalisation. However, security rules imposed in 1963 remained in force and little changed. From 1976, Syrians protested again, 'the final showdown came in 1982, with an uprising in the town of Hama which was brutally crushed by the army leaving probably more than 10,000 dead and much of the town in ruins' (BBC 2011a) Human Rights Watch commented on the backlash and concluded 'authorities continued to broadly violate the civil and political rights of citizens, arresting political and human rights activists, censoring websites, detaining bloggers, and imposing travel bans' and continues 'Syria's multiple security services continue to detain people without arrest warrants and frequently refuse to disclose their whereabouts for weeks and sometimes months, in effect forcibly disappearing them' (HRW 2011). Notably, Kurds, Islamic and other politically, ethnically or religiously inspired opposition groups (e.g. Muslim Brotherhood) were targeted (ibid.). At least 17,000 people were said to have disappeared since the 1970s and 1980s. In the years prior to the 2011 events, Syria experienced a severe prolonged drought that lead to the internal displacement of several hundred thousand people (Femia, Werrell 2012) . This added 'strains and tensions on an already stressed and disenfranchised population' (ibid.) and put another question mark over the government's efforts to fairly distribute the country's resources (see BBC 2011b).
From
Over the course of time, Syrians had exited the country in 'three waves' either permanently as in the mid-19th century and in the mid-20th century or rather temporarily as in the 1990 (Mehchy, Doko 2011 ). This has been described as responses to economic conditions (mid-19th century), to the restrictions under Bath-party ruling (mid-20th century) or again to economic conditions (1990s). The first two waves largely went to the Americas and the US whereas the third wave was rather characterised by regional migration to the Gulf countries and Lebanon. The emigrant's stock was estimated at 4.2 per cent of the population. The history of Syria so far thus already shows a succession of 'voice' and 'exit' in response to domestic conditions. However, this is neither unique nor remarkable in terms of patterns or magnitude of flows.
In March 2011, after the resignation of Ben Ali in January 2011 in Tunisia, and Moubarak in February in Egypt, Syrians again raised their 'voice' against conditions in the country and the 'Arab spring' in Syria began with small protests in the south-western town of Daraa in the border region with Jordan; there, citizens demonstrated against the arrest and torture of some students (Burgat, Paoli, eds. 2013; Cornell University Library 2015) . When protests continued and grew security forces opened fire killing some and injuring hundreds of other protesters (BBC 2011b). In subsequent months, Syrians also protested in the cities and towns of Homs, Izraa, Banyas, Tal Kalakh, Harna, Latakia, Jisr al-Shughur, Damascus and elsewhere and the protests more and more turned into a full-fledged uprising (see Vignal 2012) . In autumn 2011, an oppositional Syrian National Council was formed and a Free Syrian Army emerged. Initially, the protests were 'pro-democracy' and 'peaceful' (Vignal 2012; HRW 2013) , in the Kurdish regions the uprising was also inspired by ideas of nationalism and independence (Orhan 2014) . Key demands were 'Overcoming of corruption', 'Against injustice', 'Freedom', 'Dignity', 'Future', 'Human rights', 'Revolution for dignity', 'We want to live', 'Live in harmony and peace', 'Build a country that respects everyone', 'Assad must go' and 'A new, free, and democratic Syria' (from a wide range of social media sources like YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter, e.g. YouTube 2012; also see Droz-Vincent 2011, for some analysis of these demands). Diverse actors as well as commentators argued this was a 'grassroots people's movement that called for democracy, freedom and rights for all Syrians' (Foreign Policy 2016) and a 'revolution' (ibid; Washington Post 2011; Syrian Revolution Network 2011).
However, in Syria, the government insisted that from the very early stage of the protests security forces were attacked by what they called 'terrorists' including 'outside infiltrators'. Also Human Rights Watch (HRW 2013) reported in June 2011 'armed confrontations between locally posted security forces and residents' in Jisr al-Shughur. Initially, the government deployed a mix of liberal and heavyhanded responses. On the one hand, it introduced a number of reforms; on the other hand, 'security forces conducted several large-scale military operations in restive towns and cities' (HRW 2011). In 2012, when a broad National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces was formed, several Islamist groups rejected joining this new coalition and deep rifts between the various actors became apparent. At least from 2012, the sectarian and Islamist element gained momentum (Rich, Conduit 2015) . In that year, the uprising turned 'into an entrenched armed conflict' and the army began shelling and bombing cities by air such as Damascus, Aleppo, Homs, Azaz and Raqqa (HRW 2013). And from the end of 2013, fighting was also reported between the Free Syrian Army and Islamist forces (BBC 2015) .
Further to this, Russia and Iran supported the Syrian regime and also the Lebanese militant group Hezbollah shored up with the regime and 'begun sending fighters' (Encyclopaedia Britannica 2015) . On the other hand, several ten thousand volunteers, so-called foreign fighters were reported to begin arriving in Syria to support the opposition and the Islamist forces (Soufan Group 2014). And from summer 2014 the renamed Islamic State (IS), a religious, conservative, anti-western, and anti-democratic grouping partly steered by the remainders of Sadam Hussein's Ba'th party elites in Iraq took advantage of the power vacuum and gained control over increasing territories in the North and East of Syria and Iraq (Reuter 2015a, b). Most notably were the advances in January 2014 on Raqqa (Syria), in June on Mosul and Tikrit (Iraq), in January 2015 on Ramadi (Iraq), in April on Aleppo, and in May on Palmyra (Syria). Finally, from June, government forces attacked Aleppo and from October 2015 Russia intervened militarily which finally shifted the power balance to the advantage of the Assad regime and led to their victory in Aleppo. As a result of the internationalisation of the conflict the country effectively turned into a battleground over issues that went well beyond the initially domestic concerns of the local demonstrators and 'voice' and large parts of the population effectively got sandwiched between the different actors. From 2014, the government regained some control of the western parts of the country, the city of Homs (BBC 2015) and in December 2016 also Aleppo (BBC 2016). By January 2017 and as a result of this roll-back large parts of many towns and cities were destroyed and peoples' livelihoods shattered. The death toll had reached around 400,000, half of them civilians (UNOCHA 2017).
The backlash to 'voice' causes another major 'exit'
Already in June 2011, three months after the beginning of the unrest, 'voice' began turning into 'exit' and the first 10,000 or so refugees fled from the fighting and the increasingly 'indiscriminate violence' (Baczko, Gilles, Quesnay 2013) by the state forces, like in Jisr al-Shughur, to Turkey (BBC 2015) . Though by the end of the year only 7,600 were still recorded whilst the others had returned; at the same time, around 3,000 people escaped from the fighting in Tal Kalakh to Lebanon (HRW 2011) and 2,000 fled from Daraa to Jordan (MPC 2014) . This shows that at the beginning of the conflict only small numbers of people fled Syria and some of those who did returned within a short period of time. Thus 'voice' was not yet followed by 'exit'. However, in 2012, the offensive of the Syrian army and subsequent fighting in Homs, Hama and other cities in western Syria displaced 175,000 people who mostly went to Lebanon (Wilson Centre 2013) whereas fighting in Aleppo in north west Syria dispersed 200,000 or more people to Turkey; meanwhile only 2,400 were registered in Jordan (UNHCR 2012). By the end of 2012, 314,000 (HRW 2012) to 375,000 Syrians (taking the Wilson Centre 2013 numbers) had fled to other countries. In March 2013, already the one millionth Syrian refugee was registered by UNHCR and within only another six month this number doubled to two million (MPC 2014) . This illustrates that the first wave of forced migration was caused by the offensive of the Syria army. From June 2014, another half million people fled Mosul from the IS (ibid.).
From 2014, Turkey overtook Lebanon as main refugee receiving country. The offensive of IS contributed significantly to the second large wave of forced migrants. By March 2015, around nine million Syrians, 40 per cent of the total population of 23 million, were forcefully displaced due to government suppression of the protests, the civil war and fighting between the different groups and the onslaught of IS. Of these, 3,988,593 (15/4/2015) or 17 percent of the total population were international refugees (UNHCR 2015a). About 1,718,000 were registered in Turkey, 1,187, 000 in Lebanon, 626,000 in Jordan, 245,000 in Iraq and 134,000 in Egypt. From autumn 2015, and coinciding with another recruitment drive by the Syrian army and the Russian intervention numbers of refugees rose again so that by the end of 2016 2.9 million Syrians were registered in Turkey, 53 per cent men, 47 per cent women and 1.35 million minors (ibid.) plus another 216.349 people of other nationalities who were registered as asylum seekers (UNHCR 2015a, DGMM 2017).
The above figures on stocks of refugees imply a rather uni-directional process of 'exit' from Syria to its neighbours; however, an analysis of the flows reveals that migration has been rather dynamic. Indeed, UNHCR (2014) inflow and outflow figures in the refugee camps suggest that from April to October 2013 almost as many refugees returned to Syria as new refugees arrived. Another report suggests that Syrians repeatedly move from their Syrian home towns to refugee camps within Syria, across the border into Turkish camps and back to Syrian campsthere were at least 25 on the Syrian-Turkish border -and even their home towns depending on the state of the fighting (Orhan 2014) . This implies that initially, Syrians went back as soon as the hot phase of the conflict was over, considered their 'exit' a short-term strategy and thus part of a broader coping strategy. Only from November 2013 to April 2014 arrivals overtook returns. In the same period, monthly arrivals to non-camp locations increased from 18,200 in October 2013 to 56,600 in April 2014 . It seems that only with the continuation of the fighting and due to the massive destruction of cities and livelihoods and dwindling hopes for a change of government (also see AFAD 2013) the displacement became more protracted.
Of our sample, only 11 out of 141 Syrians (7.8 per cent) considered themselves as opposition and even fewer suggested that they or members of their family were involved in civil disobedience, or even more actively in protests or fighting and hence in 'voice'. Those few stated, for instance, 'my husband was a rebel with the Free Syrian Army, but he has gone missing [she assumed that he is dead]' (ATH1); 'I rejected their offer to work as the coach of the Syrian army football team' (ATH21), 'I was an Airforce Colonel. … I refused dropping barrel bombs, I was arrested and imprisoned for eight months' (MYT44); 'I … joined the FSA. … I couldn't go anywhere else; the regime would kill me' (MYT 59); 'I am from Homs [from rebel controlled area]' (MYT75); and 'I am a journalist. I escaped from Assad because I was threatened' (TR 8). Another researcher (Cantegin 2014) found that 37 of the 111 respondents of her quantitative research were involved in fighting (though it cannot be established how many of these fought on the side of the revolution, hence on the side of 'voice' and how many were in the government army and rather involved in the backlash). And of the 29 respondents of her qualitative study 12 were somewhat involved in actions that could quality as 'voice'. The majority in both studies, however, was not. Most reported that they had not actively participated in 'voice' but were rather affected by the backlash. One respondent pointedly explained 'it's like the tragedies of WW2. Assad, ISIS, rebels; there I was between them' (MYT45). This suggests that the overwhelming majority of Syrian refugees were not forced to 'exit' as a consequence of their action expressing 'voice'; instead, they were forced to 'exit' due to the actions of others.
Finally, there was an often-overlooked counter-flow from various countries through Turkey into Syria, and that was the migration of individuals aiming to join the fighting in Syria and Iraq as Jihadists but also some Kurdish freedom fighters. This flow of foreign fighters notwithstanding their diverse, contested or even perverted motives can be interpreted as a kind of protest for a course that the individuals consider justified (e.g. Vidino 2014) and thus a version of 'voice'. Those who joined IS engaged in a perverted version of 'voice' whereas those who migrated for the purpose of engaging in a revolution rather 'exited' for the purpose of engaging in genuine 'voice'. However, what is temporary and when temporary becomes permanent is not defined by law but appears to being determined by the Migration Policy Board, a body foreseen by the new law (art. 105) to determine further legislation and its interpretation.
In response to the influx of refugees, Turkey set up reception camps for Syrians (MPC 2014); 25 by 2015. The largest camp has been set up in 2015 near Suruç, it has the size of a small town and accommodates 35,000 Syrians mostly from Kobane; other large camps are Akcakale tent camp in Şanlıurfa with over 25,000 Elbeyli Beşiriye container camp in Kilis with 23,000 and Ceylanpınar tent camp also in Şanlıurfa with 20,000 people (Orhan 2014) . The three camps in Şanliurfa combined host 73,300 refugees, the four camps in Gaziantep 32,700 and the two camps in Kilis 27,300 (AFAD 2013). Conditions in these camps are that refugees are provided with accommodation, food, and other benefits and had full access to health care and education. Refugees outside camps and in rural and urban areas -at least 91 per cent of all Syrians (UNHCR 2015a) -initially had no access to such provisions and have been rather neglected (Erdogan 2014 , Orhan 2014 ). 'One out of four non-camp refugees lives in inadequate conditions or in an open area. About 62 per cent of Syrian refugees residing out-of-camp live together with at least seven people in sometimes very crowded conditions' (UN 2014, 4) . Also 'children outside of the camps face obstacles in attending school, including the insufficient number of schools, teachers and lack of transportation' (ibid.). On the one hand, the social conditions of at least some of the refugees are desperate, 'conditions have been forcing some of the refugees to beg on streets', 'Syrian beggars have become increasingly visible in Istanbul, including women and young children, passports in outstretched hands, tapping on car windows in the city's dense traffic' and 'a growing number is living in derelict buildings or sleeping in parks'. It is also claimed that 'some business owners have been employing Syrian refugees as a cheap labor force' whilst the government does not issue work permits to these people (ibid.). As a result, at least some Syrians are forced to work for wages below the reproduction level and have become working poor (all Orhan 2014) . And despite all efforts to provide education to children this remains an issue; indeed, initially only 15 per cent of the children seemed to have received education (Erdogan 2014) . There are also reports about prostitution and early marriage of refugee girls; this implies that women are particular vulnerable and that refugee suffering is gendered (Orhan 2014) . In 2013, Turkey began registering and issuing ID number and an ID document to Syrians. These IDs serve as entry card to social services and thus grant rights that are almost equal to the rights of Turkish citizens, at least on paper though in reality there are still shortcomings (see, for e.g., Cantegin 2014). Access to work permits was restricted and only has been relaxed in January 2016, too late to affect conditions during the first 5 years of the Syrian refugee presence in Turkey.
And despite official reassurance that Syrians are welcomed as brothers and sisters, 49.8 per cent of Turks do not want them as neighbours, 70.7 per cent believe they are a burden on the economy, 76.5 per cent believe they cause Turkey problems. Therefore, 30.6 per cent suggest they should be send back 'even though the war is ongoing', 41.6 per cent suggest they should not have been admitted in the first place, 45.1 per cent expect all of them to return after the war (Erdogan 2014) . Occasionally, Turkish citizens even organised protests like in Kahramanmaraş, Şanlıurfa and Gaziantep (e.g. Hurriyet Daily News 2014); this can be conceptualised as a clash between the 'exit' of Syrians and the 'voice' of Turks.
Our research found that a certain proportion of Syrian and other refugees was fairly dissatisfied with these conditions in Turkey: 'I don't want to stay in Turkey since I don't think Turkey will provide stable protection for us while I can get refugee status in Europe' (TR26). Equally, an Iraqi woman argued 'we applied to the UN but they gave us the interview date only in seven years. They told us to wait seven years. So we decided to come to Izmir to go to Greece' (TR19). These accounts reveal that lack of status contributed a great deal to the frustration of refugees. Further to this, we found that few of the Syrians in Izmir were aware of the UNHCR or informed about the refugee policies. Also, other Kurds interviewed in Athens in 2015 argued that 'we couldn't have stayed because Kurdish people have problems there' (ATH11). Several others pointed out, 'if I could have earned more in Turkey, I would have preferred to stay in Turkey but life is expensive here, we cannot survive here on short-term illegal jobs' (TR3). Indeed, one third of the 215 interviewees in Greece explained that they had left Turkey because they could not secure livelihoods there. In addition, lack of proficiency in Turkish language seemed another major obstacle in finding a proper job in Turkey. As TR11 put it, 'I searched for a job in Turkey but I do not speak Turkish and this is a great problem. If I spoke Turkish and found a job, I would prefer to stay in Turkey'. The following account sums up the arguments typically made by our respondents: 'Life was difficult in Turkey. We didn't know the language, and we couldn't apply for asylum there. There were no jobs there' (ATH17). There is little evidence, that refugees raised their 'voice' and stage any significant protests against these conditions. Instead, this dissatisfaction contributed to a second wave of 'exit', this time from Turkey, and contributed a great deal to the (irregular) onward migration of over one million people from Turkey to the EU. Whilst in 2013, 24,947 people irregularly migrated from Turkey to the EU, Greece and Bulgaria, in 2014, this figure rose to 58,835 (62 per cent were Syrian) and to around 884,600 people in 2015 (Frontex 2014 (Frontex , 2015 . Departures from Turkey increased from 1,964 in January 2015 to 54,899 in July, 107,843 in August, 147,143 in September and 211,663 in October and then began dropping to 108,742 in December and 67, 515 in January 2016 and finally to 3,650 in April and stayed on that level ever since (UNHCR 2015b, c) . In total, in 2016, another 273,450 people arrived in Greece. Of the people departing from Turkey 56 per cent were Syrians, 24 per cent Afghans, 10 per cent Iraqis, and one percent Somalis, the remaining six percent were from various countries like Eritrea and Morocco.
Closed borders aiming to prevent 'exit' provoke more 'voice' and enforce 'exit' again Meanwhile, the EU kept its border closed and prevented regular migration. Already from 2011, the Turkish-Greek land border was closed, a fence built in 2012 and an extra 1,500 patrols deployed (European Commission 2011; Euronews 2012) and in 2013, Bulgaria too built a fence and 'closed its border to Syrians' (Washington Times 2014). In addition, the EU also compelled Turkey in course of the EU's membership negotiations and through compulsory policy transfer through its Instruments for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) and other programmes to comply with EU expectations and better control her borders and exit to the EU to suppress transit migration (Düvell et al. 2014) . Notably, from March 2016, when an EU-Turkey Agreement came into force Turkey efficiently managed to almost stop onward migration. From summer and in particular from autumn, winter 2015 various other member states one by one took measures to prevent onward migration. France, Sweden, Denmark, Germany, Hungary, Slovenia and Croatia re-introduced controls on the otherwise open internal Schengen borders; also Macedonia and Serbia closed their borders to refugees and migrants (e.g. Guardian 2016). In addition, the number of Schengen visa issued to Syrians dropped from 31,876 in 2010 to only 385 visas in 2015 and remained on this low level (EU Commission 2016). Hence, from mid, late 2015 and early 2016, the migration of refugees from many countries including Syrians was de facto brought to a halt. However, this was met by another wave of protests or 'voice' by the refugees and migrants which temporarily compelled government to open the borders and allow 'exit' to happen.
In Turkey, in summer 2015, refugees and migrants supported by human rights activists staged a protest demanding the opening of the land borders with Greece. One of our informants recalled 'I was reading this FB group … that Syrians will gather in Edirne to protest. So from Istanbul I started walking with many people to Edirne. It was a march; there were a lot of people; and journalists. After 18 hours of walking we arrived outside Edirne; 500 people in total. We had a banner saying "Let us pass". The police didn't let us enter Edirne. We wanted to join the other Syrians who were already protesting in the city of Edirne' (MYT53). Protests were also held on the Greek island of Lesbos, 'Riots erupt on Lesbos: 200 refugees throw stones at police and coastguard officials after being blocked from getting on a mainland-bound ferry' (Daily Mail 2015). On the Greek-Macedonian border, refugees staged protest and Al Jazeera (2015) reported 'Hundreds of refugees breach Macedonia border'; later the border was opened. At the Serbian-Hungarian border and in Budapest 'hundreds of refugees protested in front of Budapest's Keleti Railway Terminus for a second straight day on Wednesday, shouting "Freedom! Freedom!" and demanding to be let onto trains bound for Germany' (Al Jazeera International 2015) . Similar scenes could be observed on the border of Ventimiglia between Italy and France, in Calais at the UK border and at various other locations, notably reception centres.
The means of raising 'voice' on the borders were very similar to the means of raising 'voice' in Syria or other Arab countries, marching and assembling. In particular, waving improvised sheets of card boxes displaying the demands became omnipresent in and thus a symbol of these protests. Also, stones were thrown both in Aleppo and again at the closed borders of Macedonia and Hungary. And in Calais, France, refugees were breaking through policy lines and cutting through or climbing fences in order to get onto trains and lorries UK bound. But more importantly, some of the demands expressed at the borders and detention centres were very similar to the demands raised in Homs and elsewhere. For instance, the banners or card boxes were saying 'We don't want to die at sea', 'Open the border' (Edirne, Turkey, August), 'We want justice' (Athens 2016), 'I am human not animal', 'We demand for a peaceful place to live', 'Help us', 'Just open border', 'Only freedom' (Idomeni, Dezember 2015) , 'It is human right', 'Fleeing war is not a crime' (Serbian-Hungarian border, August 2016), 'We are humans like you', ' Merkel', 'Freedom go train', slogans shouted were 'Freedom' and Germany, Germany, Germany' (Hungary, September 2015), 'Article 3 of HRC: Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person' (Lesbos, June 2016); all quoted from a diversity of media sources like pictures in newspapers, YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, blogs, e.g. TRT World (2015) . Notably slogans referring to 'life', 'peace' and 'freedom' were running through like a red threat from the uprising in Syria to the protests at the borders. At times, it appeared as if the 'Arab spring', the initial 'voice' that triggered the events so far, was coming to Europe, respectively that the protests of Syrians and others in Europe were the extension of the protests in the Middle East and North Africa.
Partly in response, though the conditions were more complex, certain borders were opened so that the migrants and refugees could realise their ambition of onward migration. For instance, after protests at the Greek-Macedonian border this was opened again from August to November 2015 (e.g. Independent 2015). Most importantly, however, the German chancellor Merkel in response to the drama unfolding in Hungary, notably at Budapest Keleti train station announced to accept refugees in German, and not to send them back under the EU's Dublin regulations which effectively meant to open the borders from Greece to Germany (Die Zeit 2015) . And this brings me back to the starting point, Hirschman's observation notably within the context of applying his theory to the events in 1989 in Eastern Germany. In this light, the events in 2015 at Budapest Keleti train station resemble the events at the German embassy in Prague in 1989. In both cases, people were demanding to be allowed to exit their countries and get to Germany; they were literally scanting 'Germany, Germany'. Equally, the events at the borders of Macedonia and Hungary resembled the protests of East German refugees in the German embassy in Prague in September 1989 and demonstrations at the Berlin Wall in November 1989 which led to the fall of the Berlin Wall. What Merkel saw on TV in 2015 was very similar to what Genscher and Kohl witnessed in 1989 when they allowed people to enter Germany. Indeed, both processes unfolded in the context of social movements or 'voice' with the aim to 'exit' one and 'enter' another place.
Conclusion
The analysis of the cycle of migration and protests related to the Arab spring reveals a whole set of combinations and thus an intricate interplay of 'voice' and 'exit'. Exit may indeed precede 'voice' as Fargues (2011) analysed at the beginning of the protests. The newly gained freedoms resulting from 'voice', a successful revolution may also be succeeded by 'exit', as Harris' (2015) found in case of Tunisia. Vice versa, as I have shown, the state's response to 'voice', notably its repression, which in Syria is reinforced by an Islamic counter-revolution, may also result in 'exit'. Other than in Hirschman's model 'exit' is thus not only an option but can be the consequence of raising 'voice'. In Syria, protest, or 'voice' and the backlash forced people into involuntary 'exit'; 'exit' was no matter of choice but without alternative and thus forced. For many Syrians, the uprising did not offer a choice between 'voice' or 'exit' but turned into a succession of strategies, 'voice' was responded by repression which triggered 'exit'. Thus, a distinction between voluntary and forced exit needs to be added to Hirschman's model. Further to this, the case of foreign fighters like Kurdish freedom fighters or Jihadists suggests that individuals also turn to 'exit' as a means to an end to engage in a radical kind of 'voice'. In addition, 'voice' can have repercussions on others, notably the resilient who did not raise their voices but are nevertheless affected by the backlash and compelled to 'exit'. Hence, 'voice' can trigger a chain reaction that effects people far beyond the actual event of 'voicing' dissatisfaction. It also shows that matters do not end there in so far that conditions experienced after 'exit' -if again dissatisfying -can be responded by more 'voice' and more 'exit'. The analysis also shows that if 'exit' is not available as an optional response to dissatisfying conditions, like due to closed borders, individuals may well turn to 'voice' first with the aim to actually enforce 'exit'. However, as overlooked by Hirschman, 'exit' not only requires alternatives and indeed almost prerequisites 'entry', but because this was not usually legally possible, if at all, restricted 'exit' and 'entry' led to a whole new dynamic of 'voice' demanding 'exit' and 'entry'. Finally, up to 40 per cent of the Syrian people are not displaced or have exited the country and are either still resilient to the conditions or even 'loyal' to the government. In any case, because the linkage or often rather non-linkage between the actual individuals raising voice and those who exit suggest that 'voice' or 'exit' cannot simply be understood as descriptions of individual behaviour but rather as attributes of social processes.
Hirschman's simple concept of 'voice' or 'exit' might be applicable to some but not to the majority of Syrian refugees. Instead, most refugees did not choose 'voice' or 'exit': many were instead sandwiched between those raising 'voice' and the addressee of this, the state, whilst some were even the targets of 'voice', meaning representatives of the Syrian regime who were targeted by the opposition. They thus rather became victims of those choosing 'voice' or those choosing to repress 'voice'. Therefore, Hirschman's concept must be amended by another category, by those who are affected by 'voice' without raising 'voice' themselves and those who would normally fall into the third group, the 'loyal', but were pushed into the 'exit' group. Thus, victims of 'voice' are the dark side of Hirschman's original ideal typical model.
Further to this, the simple 'voice/exit' model turned into a whole succession of events: pre-conflict 'exit', 'voice' followed by repression and 'exit', and 'voice' again at closed borders preventing 'exit'; simultaneously, 'voice' and 'exit' interact in a dynamic fashion, 'voice' provokes 'exit', repressive responses to 'exit' provoke 'voice' et cetera. Moreover, the dynamics of 'voice' and 'exit' are determined by the interplay of liberal respectively illiberal environments in which people act and according opportunity/constraints structures. The result is thus a model much more complex than Hirschman's original. Based on patterns identified in the article and this discussion I suggest to amend Hirschman's original model as follows though more options are thinkable (Table 1) .
Finally, for historians of European and notably Eastern European affairs and in particular for analysts of the policy discourses and responses to the challenges stemming from the arrival of refugees and migrants it must be noted that some of the events of summer 2015 are actually similar to the events analysed by Hirschman in 1989 that contributed to the collapse of the authoritarian communist ruling. In both cases, a combination of repression, hunger for freedom and a life in dignity and a succession of 'voice' and 'exit' drove the events. I suggest that the response of Merkel to the demands of the people of Syria and others in 2015 was very similar to the response of Genscher and Kohl to the demands of the people of Eastern Europe in 1989 and that the people of Homs and the people of Budapest have thus probably more in common than conventionally accepted. This, however, requires further research and discussion. politika, jı́ž Turecko reagovalo, a poměry při přijetı́ rozebı́rány jako druhotný původ podmı́nek, které daly do pohybu jednotlivé rozličné reakce. Začtvrté článek zkoumá děnı́ probı́hajı́cı́ u dalšı́ migrace z Turecka do Evropské unie jako druhý typ "odchodu" a následujı́cı́ protesty uprchlı́ků na pohraničnı́ch přechodech a v zajišťovacı́ch táborech proti tamějšı́m poměrům a zejména uzavřeným hranicı́m jako druhý typ "hlasu". Č lánek tedy ilustruje, (a) že požadavky protestů v Sýrii a před evropskými hraničnı́mi kontrolami byly do značné mı́ry podobné, z čehož plyne kontinuita "hlasu"; (b) že "hlas" nebo "odchod" nepředstavovaly protichůdné reakce, nýbrž často patřily k dynamické posloupnosti reakcı́; (c) že "hlas" lze pozvednout, aby byl v souladu s "odchodem", (d) že "vstup" znamená dalšı́ důležitou kategorii, kterou je zapotřebı́ začlenit do tohoto modelu. Č lánek konečně (e) zjišťuje, kolik uprchlı́ků ani neprotestovalo, ani si dobrovolně nezvolilo odchod, nýbrž se nechtěně ocitlo mezi povstalci a státem, takže byli donuceni ze země odejı́t. Č lánek se ve světle tohoto děnı́ přimlouvá za revizi původnı́ho modelu "hlas nebo odchod" a předevšı́m uvádı́, že by se mělo brát v úvahu vzájemné působenı́ "hlasu a odchodu". Navrhuje proto mnohem komplexnějšı́ a dynamičtějšı́ model. Č lánek se nakonec odvolává na Hirschmanův pozdějšı́ výzkum revolucı́ ve východnı́ Evropě. Nástin budoucı́ho výzkumu navozuje určitou podobnost mezi nimi a revo-lucı́ v Sýrii a dospı́vá k závěru, že kupřı́kladu obyvatelé Budapešti a Homsu toho majı́ společného vı́ce, než se má obecně za to.
